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Dubai
Foreclosure of a Dream
Christopher M. Davidson
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G litzy Dubai, long considered the new Monte Carlo or the Las Vegas of the Middle East, has suﬀ ered one of the worst crash landings of this global recession. 
Dubai might be considered a bellwether of the global credit 
crunch. Until recently touted as a beacon of progress in 
an otherwise unstable region, the tiny emirate’s seemingly 
innovative economic and political model is now unravelling, 
with no end in sight to the uninterrupted stream of bad news. 
Construction has ground to a shuddering halt, unemploy-
ment is rising, sovereign debt is exposed, lawsuits are being 
prepared, and the population is decreasing, as those who 
moved to Dubai in search of a better life have either lost 
their jobs or are cutting their losses and leaving.
To make matters worse, as the city empties itself out, 
traﬃ  c thins, and cars and credit cards are abandoned at the 
airport, the embattled authorities have embroiled themselves 
in fresh controversies by introducing protectionist policies 
for their citizens and a new media law that forbids criticism 
of the economy, and earning Dubai an anti-Semitic branding 
in the sports world by denying a visa to an Israeli athlete. 
With investor conﬁ dence in tatters and debt repayments 
looming, its humiliated rulers have had little choice but to 
turn to their wealthier neighbors. But although help has 
ﬁ nally arrived, it is by no means the lifeline that the emirate 
really needs, and Dubai’s future hangs in the balance.
The Dubai Model
Th e story of the Dubai business model really begins in the 
mid-1990s. With oil exports having peaked at about 400,000 
barrels a day, the four sons of the late Sheikh Rashid bin Said 
al-Maktum were committed to building a diverse, multi-
sector economy to reduce their dependency on hydrocarbons 
and exposure to the vagaries of the international oil markets. 
If such diversiﬁ cation did not take place, it was under-
stood that the emirate would eventually lose its economic 
autonomy and, by extension, its political autonomy within 
the seven-member United Arab Emirates (UAE). Dubai’s 
new post-oil economy capitalized on its long history of trade, 
merchant immigration and re-export activity, and its relative 
openness compared to its Arab peninsular neighbors. With 
its low taxes and strong regional contacts, Dubai hoped to 
reprise its role as the region’s premier entrepôt and go global 
with its brand of economic liberalization.
Crown Prince Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktum 
took charge of the situation. Supported by Maktum, his 
eldest brother and Dubai’s nominal ruler, he forged ahead 
with the emirate’s “free zone” policies. In the late 1990s, 
Muhammad’s strategy involved expanding the original Jebel 
Ali industrial zone where foreign companies could enjoy 
100 percent ownership, and establishing several new free 
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zones. Jebel Ali soon mushroomed to over 2,000 companies, 
many of which were European and North American. By 
2001, a plethora of high-proﬁ le multinationals and other 
foreign companies, including Microsoft, Dell, Reuters and 
the BBC, were locating themselves in Muhammad’s new 
Dubai Internet City and Dubai Media City. Dubai eﬀ ectively 
became the Middle Eastern headquarters of these big global 
economic players. Since then, many other free zones have 
opened, including entire “villages” for branch campuses of 
foreign universities and health clinics, and even a Dubai 
International Financial Centre that operates under English 
common law and attempts to bridge the time zones of 
European and Asian stock exchanges.
Dubai was also committed to building up a luxury 
international tourist industry. Th e Jumeirah International 
Group, established in 1997, was responsible for building 
a number of iconic resorts, including the Jumeirah Beach 
Hotel and the Burj al-Arab—the world’s only seven-star 
hotel. So strong was the emphasis on high end tourism 
that in the late 1990s, it was estimated that ten percent of 
GDP was spent on developing this sector. By 2008, with 
hundreds of hotels, including several dozen with ﬁ ve stars, 
the emirate was hosting over six million tourists a year. 
Backed by a successful airline, two annual shopping festivals, 
and a host of international sporting and music events, the 
number of tourists was predicted to climb to ten million 
or more by 2012.
To attract investment from wealthy individuals, a real 
estate sector was introduced in the late 1990s. Although 
somewhat controversial, given that it was against UAE law 
for foreigners to own property, Sheikh Muhammad bypassed 
this complication by initially allowing foreigners to buy 
renewable 99-year leases. Real estate accelerated when the 
Nakheel property company constructed two separate “Palm 
Islands” oﬀ  the coast of Jumeirah and Jebel Ali featuring 
villas, apartments and, in cooperation with the Trump 
Organization and the Taj Group, several ﬁ ve-star hotels. 
Th ese giant patches of reclaimed land expanded Dubai’s 
waterfront from about 70 to over 500 kilometers, given that 
each “palm” has several fronds and a number of additional 
exclusive mini-islands in the shape of Arabic lettering to 
represent one of Muhammad’s most well-known poems. In 
2004, when both palms sold out, Muhammad instructed 
Nakheel to launch a third palm island and another archi-
pelago further out at sea.
Following the death of his elder brother and his formal 
installation as ruler of Dubai in early 2006, Sheikh 
Muhammad decreed that foreigners could own real estate in 
“some parts of Dubai, as designated by the ruler,” and would 
be entitled to residency visas from the Dubai government, 
thus altering the previous rule restricting residency visas to 
those with proof of employment. To further alleviate inves-
tors’ risk-averse concerns, a law was passed establishing a 
Lands Department that would provide a centralized registry 
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capable of issuing deeds. Demand for Dubai’s real estate proj-
ects soared, and additional developments were launched. In 
some cases, demand was so high that prospective customers 
were advised to arrive at sales centers on the morning of the 
launch in order to line up for lottery-like tickets that would 
entitle them to make a purchase. Emaar Properties, which 
became a 67 percent publicly owned company following its 
ﬂ otation on the Dubai stock exchange, pressed ahead with 
its magniﬁ cent Burj Dubai: a mixed residential, commercial 
and hotel complex boasting some 165 or more storeys and a 
dynamic design to be the world’s tallest structure.
By the summer of 2008, Dubai, on paper at least, had 
succeeded in diversifying its economy. With the non-oil 
sectors accounting for more than 95 percent of the emirate’s 
GDP, the hydrocarbon industry was pushed further into the 
background. An estimated $3 billion in annual foreign direct 
investment ﬂ ows underscored Dubai’s reputation as the most 
vibrant economy in the region, and UN reports ranked the 
emirate as the seventeenth most attractive economy in the 
world for foreign investment. Th e free zones were booming, 
the hotels were full, and the city’s population had reached 
two million. Mega real estate projects were being announced 
on a weekly basis and the three biggest developers were 
estimated to have produced in excess of 30,000 new homes. 
By conservative estimates, investors were enjoying annual 
returns of over 20 percent on their deposits for houses or 
apartments, while some were “ﬂ ipping” on their deposits 
within months for handsome proﬁ ts.
Enter the Credit Crunch
In September 2008, with the credit crunch entering its 
second year, Dubai appeared to have been spared the 
toxicity spreading throughout economies in the West. 
New York Magazine claimed that Wall Street bankers were 
decamping by the dozens to Dubai which, if anything, was 
growing faster than before. Delegates in Kuwait’s parliament 
complained that even without oil Dubai’s economy was 
doing better than theirs. Sheikh Muhammad was hailed as 
a visionary ruler across the Arab world, and in some cases 
far beyond. From Dubai’s side the message was equally loud 
and clear: Dubai was circumventing the global economic 
tsunami. In early October at Cityscape 2008, the emirate’s 
premier real estate convention, plans for a one kilometer-tall 
tower were announced, even as the Burj Dubai stood unﬁ n-
ished. Jumeirah Gardens and Waterfront City, projects that 
would lead to a new residential area the size of Manhattan 
Island, were being promoted aggressively. In November, as 
perhaps the ultimate Bonﬁ re of the Vanities, a $15 million 
party was staged at the brand new Atlantis Hotel. With 
hours of ﬁ rework displays and guest appearances from A-list 
Hollywood celebrities, the launching of the $800-a-night 
World Cup Races, Dubai, 2008. MARTIN PARR/MAGNUM PHOTOS
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resort on the outer edge of the Jumeirah Palm Island was a 
clear signal that Dubai was bucking the trend, and doing 
so with considerable panache.
Behind the glamor, however, the rot had begun to set 
in. Foreign investors’ interest in real estate was declining 
markedly and hotel occupancy rates began to falter as tour-
ists turned to cheaper destinations. Most seriously, Dubai’s 
banks and mortgage lenders were struggling to ﬁ nd credit on 
the international market. Loans dried up, speculators began 
to disappear, and the ﬁ rst major wave of resale properties 
began to hit the classiﬁ eds as nervous expatriates sought to 
cut their losses and run. Th e conﬁ dence bubble was pricked 
and the Dubai stock markets went into free fall, with share 
prices for erstwhile government-backed blue-chips such as 
Emaar Properties shedding over 80 percent of their value by 
December. Th e two biggest mortgage lenders, Tamweel and 
Amlak, had to be merged under a new federal authority.
A strenuous chorus of defense and denial began, led by 
the authorities and joined by stakeholders in the Dubai 
model, including expatriates who had put their entire life 
savings into real estate. Academics, think tank professionals, 
bloggers and domestic newspaper editors—none of whom 
had identiﬁ ed shortcomings in the Dubai model, let alone 
predicted the crash—contributed to a stream of articles 
and opinion editorials claiming that the emirate’s economic 
fundamentals were perfectly sound, and some went so far 
as to state that Dubai was the safest place to anchor in the 
global crisis.
The Bubble Bursts
By the end of 2008, the doomsday indicators had increased: 
Hundreds of cranes stood motionless over incomplete 
projects, employee ﬁ rings were rising, fewer lights were 
shining from the windows of tower blocks at night, and—
refreshingly for some—Dubai’s infamous traﬃ  c jams were 
easing up. Legions of laborers were sitting idle in their camps, 
and a string of high proﬁ le suspensions and cancellations 
were tersely announced, including the short-lived Jumeirah 
Gardens and Dubailand, the emirate’s much vaunted 
Disneyland-sized theme park. Sensing that the international 
spotlight was beaming in, the government came clean and 
declared that it had accumulated a giant debt of $80 billion 
or more, most of which was due for reservicing over the 
next few years. To allay fears, oﬃ  cials stated that Dubai’s 
sovereign wealth, estimated at some $85 billion, would be 
enough to cover this.
But such claims were greeted with skepticism because 
the international media was reporting that much of the 
sovereign wealth was either inaccessible or had been eroded 
signiﬁ cantly by recessions in recipient economies. Th e major 
ratings agencies, including Moody’s, downgraded Dubai’s 
Gulf Art Fair, Dubai,  2007. MARTIN PARR/MAGNUM PHOTOS
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banks, and by February 2009 the emirate’s credit default 
swaps had rocketed to Icelandic levels. Expatriates, investors 
and tourists continued to vote with their feet as thousands 
of exit visas were being processed each day. Hotels engaged 
in a price war, slashing room rates by over 70 percent. 
Newspapers, bulletin boards and blogs groaned under the 
weight of hastily produced property advertisements, some of 
which threw in all furniture and ﬁ ttings. For those laborers 
whose employers were no longer in business, hundreds were 
being rounded up each evening and bussed to the airport.
Dubai’s Descent
Th is economic collapse was taking place against an increas-
ingly unpleasant backdrop of corruption, authoritarianism 
and protectionism. With investors seeking their money 
back, pyramid schemes that had been unchecked over the 
years were being exposed. Foreign investigative journalists 
reported on expatriate real estate developers who were being 
held without charge, and even companies backed by senior 
members of the ruling family were coming under scrutiny. 
Column space in domestic newspapers began to be handed 
over to the Dubai chief of police who, oddly perhaps, 
brieﬂ y became the government’s primary spokesperson for 
economic matters. He has blamed the crisis on greed (rather 
than a lack of regulatory infrastructure or sound economic 
planning) and has refuted foreign journalists’ accounts of 
the crisis. Other government spokespeople have claimed that 
negative reporting is evidence of an international conspiracy 
to undermine Dubai’s success.
Dubai, 2006. MARK POWER/MAGNUM PHOTOS
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New legislation was introduced at the federal level, 
seemingly at Dubai’s behest, that formalizes the protec-
tion of UAE nationals in their jobs. Th is, together with 
the circulation of a draft media law that would prohibit 
criticism of the economy (under which journalists could be 
ﬁ ned up to $270,000), has sent out a fresh wave of signals 
that Dubai’s liberalization was distinctly fair weather. With 
the economic downturn, the political system is unable to 
adjust to the new realities. Perhaps the clearest example of 
the emirate’s liberal retrenchment was its denial of an entry 
visa to an Israeli tennis player who had been scheduled to 
compete in Dubai’s international tournament. Th e Women’s 
Tennis Association ﬁ ned the Dubai organizers, which led to 
the withdrawal of the event’s major sponsor, the Wall Street 
Journal, and prompted the main US tennis television channel 
to boycott the event.
By the end of February, Dubai was eﬀ ectively bankrupt 
as it struggled to service even the ﬁ rst of 2009’s major debt 
renewals. Th e Dubai stock exchange, which had earlier taken 
out loans to buy the Norwegian stock exchange, OMX, 
needed to reﬁ nance $3.8 billion of debt. A last-minute deal 
was reported in the domestic press as proof that Dubai 
could keep going, but it soon became apparent that only 
$2.5 billion of credit had been acquired on the international 
market, and that other Dubai entities had had to step in 
to make up for the shortfall. Rumors resurfaced that the 
emirate would have no option but to seek assistance from 
oil-rich Abu Dhabi, no matter how unpalatable such a move 
might be. Up to this point, Abu Dhabi had remained aloof 
from Dubai’s problems, having only injected $19 billion of 
liquidity into federal entities in November 2008, and in 
February having only guaranteed banks in Abu Dhabi, rather 
than across the whole of the UAE.
The Big Bailout
On February 25, a brief notice was posted by a Dubai govern-
ment department that the UAE Central Bank, of which Abu 
Dhabi is the major stakeholder, had bought into a $10 billion 
ﬁ ve-year bond for Dubai. With interest rates set at four 
percent, this was a lifeline for Dubai, as the emirate had 
little chance of acquiring such credit elsewhere. Although 
not technically a bailout, Abu Dhabi had devised an unsubtle 
means of channelling aid to its beleaguered neighbor and 
thereby avoiding, or at least delaying, a complete meltdown 
of the Dubai economy. In many ways, Abu Dhabi can now 
dictate terms to Dubai, and will almost certainly seek to 
centralize the federation and rein in Dubai’s autonomy. But 
given the political culture of the Gulf states, this is likely 
to be as discreet as possible and will allow the Dubai ruling 
family to save at least some face. Nonetheless, just seven 
weeks after the bond was issued, the ruler of Abu Dhabi 
made a personal visit to Sheikh Muhammad’s palace and 
took an “inspection tour” of Dubai’s projects.
Abu Dhabi’s primary concern is unlikely to be the Dubai 
business model, but rather Dubai’s close relationship with its 
major trading partner, Iran. With Iran-Dubai trade having 
reached $14 billion in 2008, the emirate was understandably 
reluctant to align itself with Abu Dhabi and the United 
States in their eﬀ orts to isolate the Iranian economy. With 
the announced closure in early March of Dubai’s creek 
side jetties, most of which service dhows laden with goods 
destined for Iran, this may be Abu Dhabi’s ﬁ rst step of many 
in severing this worrisome link.
As yet, it is unclear how the Dubai model’s epitaph 
will read. Th e emirate’s debt continues to grow and Abu 
Dhabi’s inﬂ uence can only continue to increase. Even if it 
weathers the global recession, the Dubai that emerges at 
the end of the storm will be a shadow of its former, ﬁ ercely 
autonomous self. Some may argue that Dubai has been in 
debt before, and has bounced back before. But in the past 
its debt has always been used to ﬁ nance useful physical 
infrastructure, such as ports, airports, dry docks and bridges, 
most of which ultimately enhanced its traditional role as 
an attractive regional entrepôt. In contrast, the debts of the 
new economy have been used to build up sectors that have 
aimed to bring money to Dubai and keep it there, rather 
than allowing Dubai to serve as an interlocutor. Th is has 
allowed a distinctly unsustainable “moonbase economy” to 
form on the edge of a desert. Exacerbating the situation, the 
massive, unchecked inﬂ ux of expatriates during the boom 
years has created an enormous demographic imbalance. Th eir 
departure will leave deep holes in the economy: unlike a 
recession in a developed country where redundancies will 
leave workers on the sidelines, in Dubai they have to leave 
within a month as their residency visas expire. Th eir contri-
butions to the domestic economy promptly cease, and the 
vicious circle continues.
With the beneﬁ t of hindsight, the Dubai model planners 
and visionaries must now realize that real estate, luxury 
tourism and a construction industry should never have 
been allowed to become central pillars of the economy. All 
were reliant on an uninterrupted stream of foreign direct 
investment and a perpetually favorable international credit 
climate. Little was done to slow the rampant speculation, 
and regulations were either insuﬃ  cient or were introduced 
too late. No eﬀ ort was made to build a knowledge economy 
as higher education remained little more than an economic 
sector, and no moratorium was placed on real estate projects, 
leading to a massive glut. Without longer-term visas or a road 
map towards citizenship status for real estate investors, Dubai 
also did little to engender loyalty. Perhaps the most incred-
ible aspect of the Dubai crash was how quickly it happened: 
within weeks of the credit crunch hitting the Gulf, the emir-
ate’s economy began to freeze up, and within months the 
coﬀ ers were empty. With no obvious “Plan B” and barely any 
contingency funding, the “Dubai vision” was never more than 
a giant gamble, most of it with other people’s money.        ■
